

3. We risk the defeat of Britain before we can make our military aid effective. If the British Isles should go down, we then face the unpleasant choice of signing a humiliating peace or continuing the war abroad with no British Fleet to assist us. The chances of our subduing the Continent of Europe and the Japanese Islands, simultaneously, are somewhat worse than the chances of a successful invasion of North America by the totalitarian powers. Both are very slim chances indeed.

4. We risk the immediate loss of the Philippines, all our interests in the Far East, a large part of our foreign trade and foreign investments in the Old World. Foreign trade, you will note, appears in both inventories. The difference is in the timing. We can lose it somewhat faster by going to war than by waiting. In either event the loss of Old World trade cannot be fatal to the Americas. We have every essential resource, including tin and good substitutes for rubber, within the hemisphere.

5. The United States is not yet ready to fight a two-ocean war abroad, either materially or psychologically. Our Navy is still a one-ocean fleet, our Army is in the infantile stage of mechanization, our air arm is still relatively small. When a country sets out to conquer such tough, seasoned customers as Germany and Japan together—with perhaps Russia thrown in—it is a good idea to have something more tangible than rhetoric with which to conquer them. The risk involved in thinking we can conquer with our bare hands because our hearts are pure is one of the gravest any nation can take. Ask the gallant Finns and the Greeks about this. We risk, in short, defeat.

6. If we go to war unprepared and suffer serious reverses abroad, our position in Latin America will be greatly weakened.

7. Four Americans out of five do not want to fight now, and will probably be apathetic if we do fight. It will be necessary for the administration to prove to them that the fighting is getting results. If the results are not forthcoming, apathy may turn into angry disillusionment, with alarming political consequences. So, we risk severe internal dissension.

#### A FEW QUESTION MARKS

Before coming to any final conclusions, let us spot a few question marks on both inventories. Going back to the risks of the hemisphere policy:

Certainly, it would be better to fight, if at all, with the British Fleet on our side. But who can read the future and say categorically that we must fight the totalitarians later? Suppose Hitler dies, or is deposed by the real managers of Germany? Suppose Germany, or Japan, or both, pitch into Russia a few years hence? Suppose Germany and Japan clash over India or the Dutch East Indies?

We may have to fight later, and should prepare for it to the hilt, but history has too many surprises to justify the word "inevitable" in this connection. The totalitarian powers are reasonably unified now, and will be more so if we attack them en masse; they may or may not be later. They have more men, but their combined industrial plant is no more powerful than that of the United States. Hanson Baldwin, military expert of the New York Times, recently pointed out in Harper's Magazine that we could build more than enough ships for hemisphere defense.

#### FOUR COUNTRIES QUALIFY

In my opinion, it is already too late to save the little nations as sovereign states. The power age and the bombing plane have made it impossible for any nation to insist on its sovereignty without the military force to protect it and a supply of strategic raw materials within its borders.

Only four countries qualify for sovereignty under this definition today—the United States, Germany, Japan (with resources from China), and Russia. The British Em-

pire is too scattered, geographically, to form a compact fighting unit.

Little nations will have to snuggle under the aluminum wings of one of these four, or build up federations of their own, to which they must perforce surrender their sovereignty. The little countries of Europe can only be saved in some kind of United States of Europe. Have we the plans or the power with which to set this up?

The "armed camp" risk goes for both categories. If we engage in war now we shall get a bigger and better armed camp, with a good chance that it will last equally long.

The Latin-American trade risk also appears in both lists. The hemisphere policy would attempt to meet this danger from the Axis directly, the planetary policy only indirectly.

#### PROMISES VERSUS DELIVERIES

Let us now qualify the war-risk inventory a little. Perhaps the tripartite pact does not mean what it says, and if we attack Germany we shall not have Japan to fight as well. Perhaps Russia can somehow be won over to our side. This would be excellent strategy, though it might somewhat dent the slogan of a war for democracy.

Perhaps German supplies will give out, or her long-suffering people will revolt. In this event, a conquest of Europe would not be the bloody, costly, probably impossible adventure contemplated. But the internal collapse of Germany is a long, long chance to take.

Perhaps if we go to war we shall find no place in which to fight on a large scale. It will be only a little, limited war of convoys, skirmishes, name calling, and a few long-distance air raids. This will not hurt us much, but by the same token it will not hurt our enemies much. Our prestige, however, will be seriously hurt. We have promised all things and delivered nothing.

#### CASTING THE BALANCE

This is as fair and just an inventory as I know how to make. As a hemispherist, perhaps I have unconsciously stacked the cards. If so, I invite any honest planetarian to set me right. I will not be impressed by moral objections. The national interest of the United States in the dangerous world of 1941 depends more on fire power than on moral exhortations. The enemy can always be counted on to have as strong a moral case as we have so far as his people are concerned. If he has more fire power, we are sunk.

Examining the two lists of risks, a man from Mars would say that for the United States to go to war now would be to exchange risks which are remote and uncertain for risks which are immediate and of the gravest nature.

### Albert J. Nock's Review of "Union Now" Knocks Bottom Out of Contemptible Idea

#### EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

### HON. PAUL W. SHAFER

OF MICHIGAN

#### IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, May 26, 1941

#### ARTICLE FROM SCRIBNER'S COMMENTATOR

Mr. SHAFER of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, under permission to extend my

remarks I include a review of *Union Now*, by Albert J. Nock, appearing in the May issue of *Scribner's Commentator* magazine. This review is a well-studied discussion of the much-talked-about proposal for subjugating the United States to Great Britain. It not only points out the dangers of the *Union Now* movement, but also the fallacious reasoning upon which it is based:

[From *Scribner's Commentator* of May 1941]

#### UNION NOW—A REVIEW

(By Albert J. Nock)

Mr. Clarence K. Streit's book *Union Now* is a literary curiosity. Its spirit is excellent. It is written in such deadly earnest, it is so honest, so sincere, and its sentiment is so sound, that no fair-minded critic could dismiss it lightly. Moreover, it has modesty—modesty with firmness—a rare combination of qualities in the work of any publicist in these days. To approach the book in a right frame of mind, the reader should begin with the last two pages, and then turn back. In these two pages Mr. Streit says in effect that he has done the best he could with his idea, not so well as he would wish, especially in style and arrangement, and his only desire is that others would pick up his idea and do better with it than he can. Mr. Streit shows himself fully aware that the question of who is right or wrong is a very small one, and the question of what is right or wrong is a very big one. No critic could ask better than that.

Mr. Streit is for individual freedom. He is against the current manifestations of rationalism and statism. In this he seems to be quite in the spirit of the declaration's doctrine of natural rights, though he does not discuss the point theoretically. His design calls for the constitutional union of a group of national governments somewhat like our union of a group of States. This union would be for the purpose of providing effective common government "in those fields where such common government will clearly serve man's freedom better than separate governments," leaving the present independent national government to carry on "in all other fields where such government will best serve man's freedom." The union thus formed would be made constitutionally capable of attracting nonunion governments into its group, and in this way ultimately grow into a world-wide governmental system.

In pursuance of this plan the author suggests beginning with a union of what he calls "the North Atlantic democracies," that is to say, the British Empire, the United States, the Low Countries, the Scandinavian kingdoms, France, Switzerland, and Finland. These should unite in a general governmental policy of (1) free trade, (2) common citizenship, (3) common defence, (4) a common currency, (5) a common postal and communications system. Mr. Streit thinks these five points would do for a starter. Others might be added as circumstances required, but these would be enough to be going on with.

Mr. Streit differentiates sharply (and correctly) between his idea of a union and the idea of a league or of an alliance. In the two latter, the state is the unit; in the former, man would be the unit. A league is of, by, and for the state; his union would be of, for, and by man. The union's minimum bill of rights should guarantee "not only those rights of man that are common to all the democracies, but every existing national or local right that is not clearly incompatible with effective union government" in the five fields above named.

Finally, how to bring about this union. First, Mr. Streit says, let unionists unite; let them unite and organize, then evangelize. All like-minded persons in the North At-

lantic democracies should form an international world unionist party, and then each one should devote his talents to spreading the light among his kinsfolk, neighbors, and acquaintances. In short, these persons should form an international pressure group. "Union has the great advantage," according to Mr. Streit, "that its supporters do not need to petition governments or wait on diplomats to get it; they need only turn to themselves and their neighbors." The idea apparently is that citizens of a democracy do not petition their government; they give orders to it. Hence there is no inconsistency where, two pages after this statement, Mr. Streit urges the fine old democratic expedient of writing to your Congressman; he recommends a "post-card plebiscite." These posts cards are not petitions of a servant to a master; they are orders of a sovereign to his ministers. They ask nothing of a Congressman; they merely tell him where he gets off.

The foregoing is the gist of Mr. Streit's work. The rest of the book is made up of exposition, explanation, and the answering of hypothetical objections.

Precisely so. There nevertheless remain a few little complaints against Mr. Streit and his project, which he seems not to have anticipated, and which a critic is, therefore, bound to bring out. In the first place, Mr. Streit is unsatisfactory about his democracies. "By democracy," he says, "I mean government of the totality by the majority for the sake equally of each minority of one, particularly as regards securing him such rights as freedom of speech, press, and association." Among the states he specifies, just where does he find, where did he ever find, that sort of government? Does he find it in England, perhaps, or the United States, or France? Not so anyone else could notice it. Our constitutional Bill of Rights, for example, is as notoriously a dead letter as the laws of the Medes and Persians. Indeed, Mr. Dooley hit the fact exactly when he spoke of the Constitution itself as "applicable only in such cases as it is applied to on account of its applicability."

As far as my observation goes, any state will allow its citizen full rights up to the point where some state interest makes it inexpedient for him to have them, and at that point it promptly confiscates them. The state does not care a button for the principle of liberty, but quite the contrary. It views liberty, as it views all things, in the light of practical policy in its own interest. The more liberties the citizen has, the more he tends to become quiet and docile, so the state has nothing to gain by confiscating them arbitrarily. Our citizens have had many liberties only because the occasions for suppressing them have happened to be few and infrequent. When one arises (as we shall shortly see) our "democratic" state is as quick and ruthless as any to shut down on them.

Pre-war czarist Russia seemed to me one of the freest countries I ever visited. My impression was that if you kept off politics and kept off the Greek Church, you could pretty well think, say, and print whatever you liked. I have often spoken of this to people who knew pre-war Russia well, and they all said my impression was correct. What was true of Russia in those days is as true of one type of state as another; it is as true of the North Atlantic "democracies" as of the South Atlantic "republics." What then becomes of Mr. Streit's discriminations in favor of the former? If none of these democracies, taken singly, has any respect for the principle of freedom, nor governs its totality by its majority for the sake equally of each minority of one—and certainly none of them has ever had the faintest idea of doing any such thing—then what makes Mr. Streit think they will do

it when they are signed up together in his union?

This fact rather knocks the bottom out of Mr. Streit's idea at the outset. When all comes to all, his proposal is to put his idea into effect by state action. That is to say, the groups in the various North Atlantic democracies are to bring pressure on their governments, and then these governments are to get together and form a union for the purposes that Mr. Streit describes. This notion is fatuous. It is like a proposal to put pressure on Captain Kidd, Jesse James, Claude Duval, Blackbeard, and Al Capone to get together in a union for the suppression of highwaymanry. Common experience ought certainly to show Mr. Streit that no state has any interest whatever in the kind of thing he wants, but on the contrary has every interest against it. If the pressure on the state were strong enough, his pressure groups would doubtless get something, but what would it be? Exactly what our citizenry got in their precious Bill of Rights. They would get the appearance of what they wanted, not the reality.

Mr. Streit's notion of constitution making seems equally fatuous. He has the eighth-grade schoolbook's conception of our constitutional history firmly fixed in his mind.

If Mr. Streit's plan could be put through, and then if his great union of democracies could be administered by the spirits of just men made perfect, one might think the thing would be worth trying. But unfortunately the spirits of just men made perfect are not available for this job, or indeed for any job. The main trouble with social architects like Mr. Streit, Mr. H. G. Wells, and many others, is that they lose sight of this, and plan their projects altogether too grandiose and hefty for the only structural material they can get to build with.

Mr. Streit thinks he counters on this point, but actually he misses it. He says in a per-fervid passage that man's worst weakness is that he has always had too little faith in what man could do. This may be so, but the point here is not what man can do, but what man can be. Mr. Streit's union would be administered by man, and man is simply not up to that much of a job. He can't be enough to do it in accordance with Mr. Streit's intention of a government "for the sake equally of each minority of one." Not too many are up to governing a family in accordance with that intention, let alone a State, a county, or even a village. It is ridiculous to expect it.

Moreover, on Mr. Streit's own showing, his union would be put together and administered by politicians. Well, look at them! How many could you sift out of those now in charge of the North Atlantic democracies who impress you as likely to be interested in "serving man's freedom" or in government "for the sake equally of each minority of one?" How many have shown any more than an electioneering interest in anything? Check the list on our own great democracy, from President to poundmaster, and how many would you bet on as not coming under Ben Franklin's dictum, that the duty of a democratic jobholder is first, to himself; second, to his party; third, to his country? Ben had a lot to do with democratic jobholders and jobseekers in his day, and the breed has not noticeably improved since then.

One has to be realistic about all this when one is assessing a work like Mr. Streit's. The reader should remember that while the first law of human conduct is self-preservation, the second law is exploitation, and the operation of the second law is as powerful and invariable as that of the first. Man's implicit obedience to that law has not once wavered in 6,000 years of recorded history. Next to armed force, political organization is that law's most effective instrument, and provides

the largest scope for its action. It dictated the drafting of the American Constitution. It converted the League of Nations (over which as many of us went daft as are now going daft over Mr. Streit's proposal) into a handy pocket weapon for its own purposes. What, really, could Mr. Streit expect? The same kind of men, actuated by the same kind of motives, would be floor managing his union as were floor managing the League of Nations. They would see in it simply an instrument which could be used to help buttress and copper-rivet an Anglo-American imperialism; and if Mr. Streit thinks they would be above using it in this way, I am afraid he must be put down as too pure and simple for this world. Heaven is his home.

As a matter of fact, before his plan is out of its swaddling clothes it has already been knaved into just this kind of disreputable service. Observe those who have organized to promote it. What are they? Trim off the lunatic fringe, which is abundant, and those who share in Mr. Streit's honest ignorance or zealous stupidities, and what have you left? A group of people committed to Anglo-American imperialism, heart and soul. They are the kind of Americans that the Chinese, who see so many of them in the Far East, call "second-chop Englishmen."

As I write this, I notice the announcement of another book by Mr. Streit called *Union Now With Britain*, which, I judge by its title, may help this contemptible propaganda even more than *Union Now*. The book is not yet published, so not having seen it, I cannot speak with certainty. Probably since the rest of Mr. Streit's "democracies" are pretty well out of commission, he is trying to make the best of what is left. *Union Now With Britain*, however, looks to me a lot like buying into an insolvent concern, and I suggest going at it with very long teeth.

### Award of Scholarships by University of Arkansas to South and Central American Students

#### EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

#### HON. WILBUR D. MILLS

OF ARKANSAS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, May 26, 1941

#### RESOLUTION BY BOARD OF TRUSTEES, UNIVERSITY OF ARKANSAS

Mr. MILLS of Arkansas. Mr. Speaker, under permission granted me to extend my remarks, I desire to include a copy of a resolution adopted on May 17, 1941, by the board of trustees of the University of Arkansas, which reflects the friendliness that exists on the part of the people of Arkansas toward our neighbors in South America.

Whereas it has been called to the attention of the Democratic Women's Club of Arkansas and in this way reached the public print, at the suggestion of Mrs. David Terry, wife of Congressman TERRY, that as a good-neighbor policy and a friendly gesture in these trying days through which we are passing, that the University of Arkansas should offer some scholarships to students of Central and South America.