

## CREATING AN ATLANTIC UNION DELEGATION

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APRIL 2, 1973.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed

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Mr. FRASER, from the Committee on Foreign Affairs,  
submitted the following

### REPORT

together with

### MINORITY AND ADDITIONAL MINORITY VIEWS

[To accompany H. J. Res. 205]

The Committee on Foreign Affairs, to whom was referred the joint resolution (H.J. Res. 205), to create an Atlantic Union Delegation, having considered the same, report favorably thereon without amendment and recommend that the joint resolution do pass.

#### PURPOSE

The purpose of H.J. Res. 205 is to create an eighteen-member delegation to organize and participate in a convention made up of similar delegations from other North Atlantic Treaty parliamentary democracies who wish to participate, and other parliamentary democracies the convention may invite, to explore the possibility of agreement on a declaration that it is the goal of their peoples to transform their present relationship into a more effective unity based on federal principles, and to set a target date for the achievement of the goal.

#### COMMITTEE ACTION

On January 18, 1973, Rep. Paul Findley introduced H.J. Res. 205 to create an Atlantic Union Delegation. This resolution was identical or similar to H. Con. Res. 39, H. Con. Res. 67, H.J. Res. 206, H.J. Res. 213, H.J. Res. 218, and H.J. Res. 387; altogether the resolution has a total of 78 sponsors and cosponsors in the House. The resolutions and sponsors are:

## HOUSE CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 39

Samuel S. Stratton

## HOUSE CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 67

Melvin Price

## HOUSE JOINT RESOLUTION 205

Paul Findley  
 Joseph P. Addabbo  
 Glenn M. Anderson  
 Thomas L. Ashley  
 Herman Badillo  
 Bob Bergland  
 Jonathan B. Bingham  
 John A. Blatnik  
 Edward P. Boland  
 Richard Bolling  
 Garry Brown  
 Charles J. Carney  
 Frank M. Clark  
 Don H. Clausen  
 Silvio O. Conte  
 James C. Corman  
 Thaddeus J. Dulski  
 Bob Eckhardt  
 Don Edwards  
 Marvin L. Esch  
 Dante B. Fascell  
 Daniel J. Flood  
 Thomas S. Foley  
 William D. Ford  
 Edwin B. Forsythe

## HOUSE JOINT RESOLUTION 213

Jim Wright  
 Richardson Preyer  
 Melvin Price  
 Albert H. Quie  
 Tom Railsback  
 Thomas M. Rees  
 Donald W. Riegle  
 Howard W. Robison  
 Peter W. Rodino, Jr.  
 Benjamin Rosenthal  
 Edward R. Roybal  
 Philip E. Ruppe

Herman T. Schneebeli is the author of a resolution identical to H.J. Res. 205.

The resolutions were referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, which in turn referred them to its Subcommittee on International

John Seiberling  
 Henry P. Smith III  
 J. William Stanton  
 Charles M. Teague  
 Frank Thompson, Jr.  
 Morris K. Udall  
 Jerome R. Waldie  
 John Ware  
 Clement J. Zablocki  
 John B. Anderson

## HOUSE JOINT RESOLUTION 206

Donald M. Fraser  
 Richard H. Fulton  
 Sam Gibbons  
 Henry B. Gonzalez  
 Gilbert Gude  
 Michael Harrington  
 James Harvey  
 Henry Helstoski  
 Chet Holifield  
 Frank Horton  
 Joseph E. Karth  
 Edward I. Koch  
 Peter N. Kyros  
 Paul N. McCloskey  
 Joseph M. McDade  
 Torbert H. Macdonald  
 John Melcher  
 John Moakley  
 William S. Moorhead  
 John E. Moss  
 Morgan F. Murphy  
 Lucien N. Nedzi  
 James O'Hara  
 Claude Pepper  
 Bertram L. Podell

## HOUSE JOINT RESOLUTION 218

Paul Findley  
 Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr.  
 Bella S. Abzug  
 Yvonne Brathwaite Burke

## HOUSE JOINT RESOLUTION 387

Guy Vander Jagt

Organizations and Movements, of which Rep. Donald M. Fraser is chairman.

The Subcommittee held an open hearing on March 26, 1973, at which the witnesses were: Mr. Findley, Mr. Clarence K. Streit, and Mrs. James H. Williams. Comprehensive hearings have also been held in the past three Congresses.

On March 26, 1973, the Department of State in a reply to a request from the Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Rep. Thomas E. Morgan, for the executive branch comments on the resolution, stated that "passage of these resolutions would be consonant with the goals and concepts which this Administration is seeking to achieve in transatlantic relationships."

On March 27, 1973, the subcommittee in open session agreed by voice vote to recommend to the full Committee on Foreign Affairs that H.J. Res. 205 be favorably reported without amendment.

On March 28, 1973, the Committee on Foreign Affairs considered the resolution and ordered it favorably reported without amendment by a roll call vote of 21 to 8.

The text of the letter from the Department of State follows:

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,  
*Washington, D.C., March 26, 1973.*

HON. THOMAS E. MORGAN,  
*Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs,  
House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.*

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Secretary Rogers has asked me to respond to your letter of February 26, 1973, requesting comments on the following resolutions: H. Con. Res. 39 and 67; H.J. Res. 205, 206, 213 and 218. These resolutions call for the creation of an Atlantic Union delegation which would organize and participate in a convention of delegations from the North Atlantic Treaty parliamentary democracies. The convention would explore the possibility of transforming these countries into a federal union, of setting up a timetable for such a goal, and creating a commission to advance this process.

This Administration recognizes the importance of increased cooperation between the countries of the North Atlantic area. Consequently, we believe that passage of these resolutions would be consonant with the goals and concepts which this Administration is seeking to achieve in trans-Atlantic relationships.

The Office of Management and Budget advises that from the standpoint of the Administration's program there is no objection to the submission of this report.

Sincerely,

MARSHALL WRIGHT,  
*Acting Assistant Secretary  
for Congressional Relations.*

COST ESTIMATE

The delegation can exist for a period not to exceed three years.

The total cost to the United States—including delegation expenses and any contributions toward meeting expenses of the convention—is not to exceed \$200,000 for the entire three-year authorization period.

Of this amount, not more than \$100,000 may be used for the U.S. contribution toward meeting the expenses incident to holding the convention itself, with other participating nations also paying their proportionate share. The remainder of funds is authorized for expenses of the U.S. delegation, such as transportation to and from meetings, staff salaries, and office equipment. A more detailed breakdown estimating annual cost cannot be made until dates for the convention have been agreed upon by the participating nations.

#### BACKGROUND

The steady evolution of an Atlantic Community, and within it a tightly integrated Western Europe, has proceeded for nearly a quarter of a century. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) have served to quell traditional conflicts among the member nations and erect in their place a strong bridge among nations and across the Atlantic to advance peace, security and prosperity for more than 400 million people. Common interest in economic development and security inevitably encourage political cooperation, and even partnership.

The European Economic Community (EEC) made a fundamental break with past practices among the nations of the Atlantic Community. The farsighted drafters of the Treaty of Rome realized when they created the European Common Market, partnership is a limited concept. Therefore, they envisaged an eventual political union, to be achieved gradually through stages, to ensure the permanent durability of what was accomplished through partnership. The need for such union is even more apparent now than it was when the Common Market was created in the 1950's. The increasing interdependency of nations—particularly in the Atlantic Community—caused by the technological revolution in all forms of production and communication, the enormous growth in foreign trade, world-wide inflation, recurring monetary crises, the world population explosion, pollution of the air and seas, and the widening gap between the living standards of the industrialized nations and the developing world, all call for multilateral rather than unilateral responses.

Not only is the need for political union greater now than it was fifteen years ago, but fortunately it is now more feasible than even most optimists would have predicted at that time. The expansion of the Common Market from the original six to the present nine underlines that fact. This increased European cohesiveness does not imply or necessitate a weakening of our transatlantic ties. Rather, it is a desirable step toward strengthening them.

If the development of political unity is limited to the nations of the European Community only, how will the United States, Canada and other democratic countries respond to this new political and economic super-power? Will they draw back into economic protectionism, erecting walls between Western Europe and themselves, undermining almost three decades of progress in collective security, political collaboration, economic cooperation, and peaceful exchange?

## THE NEED TO EXPLORE ATLANTIC UNION

In order to prevent the undermining of the Atlantic Community, the need is urgent for a more comprehensive goal and institution to strengthen the common defense of our free peoples, provide for a stable currency for world trade, enhance the welfare of the people of member nations and increase their capacity to aid the people of developing countries. A union of like-minded democratic countries, based on federal principles, would be such a goal and institution.

H.J. Res. 205 authorizes the exploration of agreement upon this goal.

Adoption of this resolution by the Congress would have the following positive effects which would be beneficial to all members of the Atlantic Community and the world.

First, it will have a positive impact on Europeans. It will reassure them that Atlantic Community interests occupy very high priority in the United States Congress and underscore in a substantial way the importance Congress attaches to the development of even stronger institutional ties with Canada and Western Europe.

While no government is today ready for federation, there is growing realization on both sides of the Atlantic that some more permanent, perhaps federal, solutions must be found to common problems. This is especially apparent in the areas of monetary and trade policy.

Second, it will tend to impart new confidence in world money markets at a critical time.

Third, it will dovetail perfectly with foreign policy objectives already announced by the President, who has already stated that 1973 will be the year of Europe. Enactment of the Atlantic Union resolution will help fulfill that pledge. It will complement the initiatives he began in Peking and Moscow, giving important new balance to our global policy.

Fourth, it can serve as an inspiring spark to all groups of nations anywhere in the world who face the coming decades with trepidation and with few coherent ideas for coordinated action.

Finally, if the convention is able to agree upon a common goal for the Atlantic Community, the American people can look forward to a significant improvement in the quality of life as well as the security of their liberty. Unemployment due to trade competition, defense outlays, pollution, inflation—all will be effectively reduced. Even though achievement of the goal may be distant, agreement on it will make easier safe passage over the rough spots that may be encountered along the way.

## PRESIDENTIAL SUPPORT FOR ATLANTIC UNION

Resolutions for the creation of a delegation and convention to explore the possibility of federation have been presented to Congress on numerous occasions since 1949. The resolutions have enjoyed wide bipartisan support and every President of the United States since Franklin D. Roosevelt has expressed privately his sympathy for these proposals.

This year, for the first time, the President of the United States is supporting the Atlantic Union concept and goal publicly. On

March 10, 1973, President Nixon sent the following letter to Rep. Paul Findley:

WHITE HOUSE,  
March 10, 1973.

DEAR PAUL: It was good to see you on March 2 and have an opportunity to discuss the Atlantic Union resolution and other legislative matters. Let me reiterate what I told you about the resolution. As a goal and a concept I have favored Atlantic Union for many years, dating back to my service in the Congress. As President I have made it a policy not to give specific endorsement to resolutions of this kind, but I want you to know that my long-standing position on the concept and the goal which you are seeking to achieve through this resolution has not changed.

With best wishes always,  
Sincerely,

RICHARD NIXON.

In addition, the Senate version of the resolution, S.J. Res. 21 (introduced by Senator Gale McGee) is co-sponsored by both the Majority and Minority leaders. On March 26, 1973, S.J. Res. 21 passed the Senate by unanimous consent.

#### EUROPEAN SUPPORT FOR ATLANTIC UNION

Although European interest in federation is substantial, it is appropriate that the United States, the first truly federal government as well as the biggest and most powerful nation in the Western world, should take the initiative in creating an Atlantic Union delegation. Once the United States shows its official willingness to explore Atlantic Union at a conference table, other countries can be expected to be forthcoming in response. When Congress adopted a similar resolution in 1960, a convention was easily organized. Responsible delegations comprised of prominent Europeans from all the NATO countries were anxious to meet to discuss mutual problems and new ways of meeting them.

More than 200 European parliamentarians support the International Movement for Atlantic Union or the International Association for Federal Union, both of which organizations advance interest in Atlantic Union through private action.

#### H.J. RES. 205 STRICTLY LIMITED

H.J. Res. 205 stays clearly within the limits of the Constitution of the United States and the Charter of the United Nations by providing that the recommendations of the convention "shall be submitted to Congress" (Paragraph 2), and that the "more perfect union of the Atlantic Community" shall be "consistent with the Charter of the United Nations" (preamble). The members of the delegation "shall be free from official instruction," and vote as individuals, as was the case at the U.S. Constitutional Convention in 1787. As a result, the United States government would not be bound in any way by the recommendations. After the convention has explored the possibility of agreement on "more effective unity based on federal prin-

principles," any conclusions and recommendations would have to be reported to the United States Congress for further consideration.

Contrary to being a challenge to the U.S. Constitution and our way of life, the resolution actually proposes only the exploration of a way to apply the genius of this same constitutional system to a wider area of land and more people. Those with faith in the American system will welcome this prospect.

The convention could not cause any lessening of individual liberty or the sovereignty of the individual citizen. The personal liberties enshrined in the Bill of Rights are perhaps the single most important contribution of American political thought to the history of mankind. They are inviolate.

## MINORITY VIEWS—HOUSE JOINT RESOLUTION 205

Our opposition to H.J. Res. 205—as to H.J. Res. 900 (its predecessor in the 92d Congress)—is based largely on practical considerations. Although we support the concept of Atlantic cooperation and such worthy objectives as “strengthening common defense, while cuttings its cost”, “facilitating commerce of all kinds”, and “enhancing the welfare of the people of the member nations”—we fail to see how adoption of this far-reaching proposal could contribute toward the attainment of these goals.

There is, in fact, no higher priority at this stage in American-European relations than the effort to reach a mutually beneficial accommodation with the nations of Western Europe—especially with the European Economic Community which the United Kingdom has now joined. President Nixon has said that 1973 will be the “year of Europe”, and it is apparent that much difficult, painstaking negotiation lies ahead for both sides.

Atlantic cooperation is indeed essential if continued crises in the monetary field are to be avoided in the future. It is also very much in the interest of the United States to reach an agreement with the EEC nations on trade—an agreement which is equitable—which grants fair access to the European market for American products and at the same time safeguards legitimate European interests. However, even the most optimistic leaders on both sides of the Atlantic agree that the search for a viable compromise on these difficult and complex issues will not be easy.

The prospect of extending such collaboration—if it can be realized at all—to include some form of “federal union” is quite obviously remote. The development is simply “not in the cards.” In fact, an *attempt* now to form such a union or even to *explore the possibility* could very well boomerang to the disadvantage of all concerned.

This is a point worth emphasizing. Proponents of H.J. Res. 205 have consistently argued that what is being proposed here is merely a tentative, exploratory effort to ascertain whether, in fact, there is any interest in the proposal to transform NATO into “a more perfect Union”. No commitment is being made at this stage, they assert, and *only* if sufficient interest is shared by those participating and if agreement can be reached on specific proposals, will further authorization be sought from the appropriate national legislative bodies. *At worst*, they contend, nothing will come of the idea, and therefore the resolution is *harmless*. It is this very line of reasoning, however, which we consider to be of questionable validity. For years, it may be recalled, the French balked at the prospect of British entry into the European Community—in part because of fears that the United States might thereby increase its economic influence in Europe. The

United Kingdom, it was argued by traditional opponents of British membership in the EEC, represented the U.S. "Trojan Horse" on the European Continent.

Such fears have been at last assuaged and British membership has become a reality. But passage of H.J. Res. 205 would offer those critics a new opening and a new opportunity. Once again, the charge may be heard that the United States by sponsoring this proposal has developed an ill-conceived device for re-establishing U.S. "hegemony" in Western Europe . . . via the "backdoor." We seriously question whether an attitude by the U.S. of this kind and at this time would promote the cause of Atlantic unity and cooperation. It might well lead instead to Atlantic discord and recrimination.

Our misgivings include especially the semi-official character of the proposed Atlantic Union "delegation". The eighteen "eminent citizens" composing such a delegation, are to be appointed by the Speaker of the House, the President of the Senate, and the President of the United States. This gives them the formal sanction of the U.S. government.

So much for our primary objection to this Atlantic Union proposal. We feel that H.J. Res. 205 represents a *noble, early post-war idea whose time has long since passed—a utopian concept which is long on idealism and short on realism* . . . More importantly, this resolution also contains elements of real danger. H.J. Res. 205 is by no means as innocuous as its sponsors would have us believe.

Let us examine some of the specifics: The European nations which are to be asked to send delegates to an Atlantic Union convention do not include all the Members of NATO, but only such "parliamentary democracies as desire to join in the enterprise." Greece, presumably, is not presently qualified to join because of the nature of its present government. "Other parliamentary democracies" may however, be invited to participate from outside the "Atlantic" area. One can only surmise about which "other countries" might receive invitations—Japan? Australia? New Zealand? Mexico? Any democratic country in Africa or Latin America?

Despite this vagueness in language and haziness as to its purpose, the resolution nevertheless indicates that what is sought, eventually at least, is the development of a federal union to replace existing ties between friendly nations, most especially those in the North Atlantic Treaty alliance. What is sought is a "common defense" policy . . . a single "stable" currency, a single policy regarding international trade, and an agreement as to how this new federal union might increase its aid to developing nations. These decisions, it should be emphasized, are to be made by the union. They will be binding on all members of the Union, regardless of the feelings of individual member nations. In other words, adherence to such a union necessarily involves an impairment of national autonomy.

How feasible are such goals? How desirable are they? At this stage in world affairs, is it likely that friendly nations would recognize their growing interdependence by opting for a formal union?

Assuming a decision could be reached that a federal union should be established, how would that goal be clearly defined? And what is meant

by the search for agreement on a "timetable" to achieve that end? Would all delegates be "free from official instructions" or only the American delegation? Would voting be by individuals or by delegations? And what is meant by a commission to facilitate "advancement by stages" to a federal union?

The sponsors of H.J. Res. 205 may argue that all of these questions can be answered in due course, during the convention's deliberations. However, *before* authorizing an American initiative of this character and magnitude, such questions need to be thoroughly discussed. Furthermore, we are highly skeptical that such a convention would *ever* become a reality, even if Congress were in cautious enough to suggest that the United States should take the lead in promoting it.

L. H. FOUNTAIN.

LEE H. HAMILTON.

ABRAHAM KAZEN, JR.

ROY A. TAYLOR.

WILLIAM S. MAILLIARD.

PETER H. B. FRELINGHUYSEN.

H. R. GROSS.

EDWARD J. DERWINSKI

VERNON W. THOMSON.

JOHN H. BUCHANAN, JR.

J. HERBERT BURKE.

ADDITIONAL MINORITY VIEWS OF THE  
HONORABLE J. HERBERT BURKE

The resolution to create an Atlantic Union delegation is an idea whose time has passed.

In my opinion, there are at least three things wrong with the idea, maybe more:

- (1) It represents the one-world concept.
- (2) It would submerge our national philosophy of life to the will of other nations.
- (3) It would lead to a "giveaway" of part of our sovereignty as a nation.

The one-world idea is totally out-of-step with the real world in which we live and work. This is a world in which nationalism is now the driving force and will continue to be in the foreseeable future. Nationalism is healthy. Nations can retain their sovereignty and still work together as separate entities, as we do through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

I think our membership in the United Nations is a good example of an international organization which has cost us dearly, but from which we have benefited little.

How much more dangerous and costly it would be for the United States to move toward Atlantic Union by establishing a delegation that "shall be free from official instructions, and free to speak and vote individually in the convention."

I think we should have learned from our United Nations experience that this country cannot rely on others to be concerned about the vital interests of the United States and its people. A Federal Union with other nations where we could be outvoted as at the U.N., could lead to even larger giveaway programs than we are now carrying out through foreign aid.

Our way of life and our goals as a nation are too precious to jeopardize by joining in a Federal Union with other nations each of which has its own culture and national aspirations.

Let us cooperate with other nations when it is demonstrably in our interest to do so, but let us say "no" to the unrealistic concept of an Atlantic Union.

J. HERBERT BURKE.

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