

ATLANTIC CONVENTION

MARCH 2, 1976.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed

Mr. FRASER, from the Committee on International Relations, submitted the following

REPORT

together with

MINORITY VIEWS

[To accompany H.J. Res. 606]

The Committee on International Relations, to whom was referred the joint resolution (H.J. Res. 606) to call an Atlantic Convention, having considered the same, report favorably thereon without amendment and recommend that the joint resolution do pass.

PURPOSE

The purpose of H.J. Res. 606 is to create an eighteen-member delegation to organize and participate in a convention made up of similar delegations from other North Atlantic Treaty parliamentary democracies who wish to participate, and other parliamentary democracies the convention may invite, to explore the possibility of agreement on a declaration that it is the goal of their peoples to transform their present relationship into a more effective unity based on federal or other democratic principles. In addition, the proposed convention would discuss agreement on a timetable for transition by stages to the goal of greater unity, and establish a commission or other means to facilitate this transition.

COMMITTEE ACTION

On July 31, 1975, H.J. Res. 606 along with identical resolutions H.J. Res. 607, 608, 609, and 610, was introduced by the Honorable Paul Findley, to create an Atlantic Convention Delegation. H.J. Res. 606, and its companion measures has the support of 110 members of the House of Representatives. The resolution's sponsors and cosponsors are:

HOUSE JOINT RESOLUTION 606

Paul Findley	John B. Anderson
Clement J. Zablocki	Richard Bolling
Dante B. Fascell	Manuel Lujan, Jr.
Robert N. C. Nix	Spark Matsunaga
Gus Yatron	Morgan F. Murphy
Michael Harrington	Claude Pepper
Leo J. Ryan	Melvin Price
Charles Wilson (Tex.)	Albert H. Quie
Donald W. Riegle, Jr.	Peter Rodino
Cardiss Collins	Herman T. Schneebeli
Helen Meyner	B. F. Sisk
Edward G. Biester, Jr.	Leonor K. Sullivan
Brock Adams	

HOUSE JOINT RESOLUTION 607

Donald M. Fraser	Yvonne B. Burke
Joseph P. Addabbo	Bob Carr
Glenn Anderson	Elford A. Cederberg
Les Aspin	Silvio Conte
Les AuCoin	James C. Corman
Herman Badillo	Lawrence Coughlin
Max Baucus	Dominick V. Daniels
Berkley Bedell	Thomas Downey
Alphonzo Bell	Robert Drinan
James J. Blanchard	Robert Duncan
Michael Blouin	Robert W. Edgar
Lindy (Mrs. Hale) Boggs	Don Edwards
Garry Brown	

HOUSE JOINT RESOLUTION 608

Jim Wright	William F. Goodling
Glenn English	Willis D. Gradison, Jr.
Marvin L. Esch	Gilbert Gude
Frank E. Evans	Tim L. Hall
Millicent Fenwick	Mark Hannaford
Joseph Fisher	Herbert Harris
Daniel J. Flood	Augustus F. Hawkins
Harold Ford	Philip H. Hayes
Bill Frenzel	John H. Heinz, III
Richard H. Fulton	Henry Helstoski
Robert N. Giaimo	Frank Horton
Sam Gibbons	Andrew Jacobs, Jr.

HOUSE JOINT RESOLUTION 609

Allan T. Howe
 Ed Jones
 William M. Ketchum
 Martha Keyes
 John J. LaFalce
 Robert L. Leggett
 William Lehman
 Clarence D. Long
 Paul N. McCloskey
 Matthew F. McHugh
 Abner J. Mikva
 Parren J. Mitchell

Joe Moakley
 William S. Moorhead
 Charles A. Mosher
 Stephen L. Neal
 Lucien N. Nedzi
 Henry J. Nowak
 James Oberstar
 James G. O'Hara
 Richardson Preyer
 Tom Railsback
 Thomas M. Rees
 Ralph S. Regula

HOUSE JOINT RESOLUTION 610

Matthew J. Rinaldo
 Theodore M. Risenhoover
 Robert A. Roe
 Philip E. Ruppe
 James H. Scheuer
 John F. Seiberling

William A. Steiger
 Frank Thompson, Jr.
 Charles Thone
 Morris K. Udall
 Richard F. Vander Veen
 G. William Whitehurst

The resolutions were referred to the Committee on International Relations, which in turn referred them to the Subcommittee on International Organizations, chaired by the Honorable Donald M. Fraser.

The Subcommittee held an open hearing on September 8, 1975, receiving testimony from the following witnesses: Representative Allan T. Howe, Dr. Walter H. Judd, Mr. Adolph W. Schmidt, Mr. Theodore C. Achilles, Mr. James R. Huntley, Mr. Clarence K. Streit, Mrs. James H. Williams, and Mr. Peter Szanton. The subcommittee also received the testimony of Representative Leo J. Ryan. Hearings have also been held in the past four Congresses.

BACKGROUND

For a quarter century, along with more tightly-knit Western Europe, an increasingly interdependent Atlantic Community has been evolving. Within the framework of common defense and economic coordination—institutionalized in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 1949, the Organization for European Development Cooperation (OEDC) 1950, the European Economic Community (EEC) 1957, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 1961—the war-ravaged nations of Western Europe have produced a spectacular recovery and jointly advanced peace, security, and prosperity for about 400 million people. Through membership or encouragement or both, the United States has played a key

role in organizing and helping develop those institutions for meeting common needs and solving common problems.

But as some of the critical challenges posed by post-war recovery eased, new issues—some quite divisive—cropped up. French opposition to British entry into the Common Market strained London-Paris relations as well as U.S.-French ties. Most recently, the crises in Cyprus and Portugal have marked a new low for the NATO alliance. And the United States Government seeing reluctance and confusion among its allies, has resorted to unilateral action. Just as often, our European partners have resented what many viewed as American dominance. Nonetheless, most European nations and people continue to regard the United States as a friend, and look for fulfillment of a long-promised partnership.

It was perhaps prophetic that when the NATO pact was being debated, Senator Arthur Vandenberg stated, "unless the Treaty becomes far more than a purely military alliance it will be at the mercy of the first plausible Soviet peace offensive." Similarly, the drafters of the Treaty of Rome realized when they created the European Common Market that partnership is a limited concept, and envisaged an eventual political union, achieved gradually through stages, to impart durability to the gains of partnership.

The need for such cohesion is more apparent now than it was when the Common Market was created in the 1950's. The increasing interdependency of nations—particularly in the Atlantic Community—caused by the technological revolution in all forms of production and communication, the enormous growth in foreign trade, world-wide inflation, the search for energy resources, recurrent monetary crises, the world population explosion, environmental degradation, and the widening material and political gap between the industrialized nations and the developing world, all call for joint rather than separate responses.

Also, despite the problems within the European Community and with US policy toward the region, some form of political integration is now more feasible than when most of the institutions of European cooperation and trans-Atlantic cooperation were first proposed. The expansion of the Common Market from the original six to the present nine underscores that fact. This increased cohesion within Europe does not imply or necessitate a weakening of transatlantic ties. Similarly, greater transatlantic cohesion should not imply or necessitate a weakening of community ties within Europe. Rather it suggests a step toward strengthening cohesion among our allies. How should the United States, Canada and other democratic countries respond to a new political and economic unity within the European Community? Will the United States draw back into economic protectionism, erecting barriers between Western Europe and themselves, interrupting almost three decades of progress in collective security, political collaboration, economic cooperation, and peaceful exchange? Or will the United States once again help frame, guide, and if we find it desirable, possibly join a new, more cohesive trans-Atlantic and perhaps even broader unity that both serves national interests and protects individual rights?

DIVIDENDS OF CALLING AN ATLANTIC CONVENTION

It is probable that the Atlantic Community must become stronger or it will gradually become weaker. To prevent any weakening, the need is urgent for a more comprehensive goal and appropriate institutions to strengthen the common defense of our free peoples, provide for a stable currency for world trade, enhance the welfare of the people of member nations and increase their capacity to aid the people of developing countries. There is a growing realization on both sides of the Atlantic that some more permanent, perhaps federal, solutions must be found to common problems.

H. J. Res. 606 authorizes exploration of whether to adopt such a goal, and how to develop such institutions. Adoption of this resolution by the Congress would have positive benefits, for both the Atlantic Community and the world, in several important areas.

First, American relations with Europe would be enhanced. It would reassure concerned European leaders that Atlantic Community interests rank high in US priorities. It would underscore in a substantial way the importance Congress attaches to the development of even stronger institutional ties with Canada and Western Europe.

Second, it would bolster a seriously weakened international economy. It would impart new confidence in world money markets because it would demonstrate US willingness to harmonize trade relations looking toward the improvement of employment throughout all participating countries.

Third, it would begin to make good on long-awaited plans for a more effective, more equitable Atlantic partnership.

Fourth, it would serve as an inspiration to all peoples and nations facing future decades laced with seemingly intractable problems. And with democracies becoming increasingly scarce, such a move could also provide an example of how cooperation based on democratic principles can promote peace and prosperity.

Finally, if the convention is able to agree upon a common goal for the Atlantic Community, and if Congress in fulfillment of its Constitutional responsibilities decides to adopt that goal, the American people can look forward to a significant improvement in the security of their liberty.

BROAD SUPPORT FOR ATLANTIC CONVENTION

Resolutions for the creating of a delegation and calling of a convention to explore the possibility of some form of greater unity have been presented to Congress on numerous occasions since 1949. As attested to by the current 110 sponsors and cosponsors, the concept enjoys broad bipartisan support. Every President of the United States since Franklin D. Roosevelt has expressed his sympathy for these proposals. As the House Minority Leader in 1973 President Ford pledged his support for an almost identical resolution and voted to bring it up for consideration. More recently, in a letter to the Honorable Paul Findley (R-Illinois), dated December 17, 1975, Ambassador-at-large Robert McCloskey stated, "Our close relationship with

Western Europe is a keystone of our foreign policy and the expression of the natural affinity of the vast majority of Americans, I have no doubt that the Executive Branch will continue to support the goals expressed in your resolution."

EUROPEAN SUPPORT FOR ATLANTIC CONVENTION

Although European interest is substantial, it is appropriate that the United States, the first truly federal government as well as the largest most and powerful nation in the Western community, should take the initiative in creating an Atlantic Convention delegation. Once the United States has shown its official desire to explore possibilities at a conference table, other countries can be expected to follow suit. When Congress adopted a similar measure in 1960, a convention in Paris was easily organized. Responsible delegations comprised of prominent Europeans from all the NATO countries were anxious to meet to discuss mutual problems and new ways of meeting them.

HOUSE JOINT RESOLUTION 606 STRICTLY LIMITED

H.J. Res. 606 stays clearly within the limits of the Constitution of the United States and the Charter of the United Nations by providing that recommendations of the convention "shall be submitted to Congress" (Paragraph 2), and that the "more perfect union of the Atlantic Community" shall be "consistent with the United States Constitution and the Charter of the United Nations" (Preamble). The members of the delegation "shall be free from official instruction," and vote as individuals. (Paragraph 3(d)).

As a result, the United States government would not be bound in any way by any recommendations made. After the convention has explored the possibility of agreement on "more effective unity based on federal or other democratic principles," any conclusions and recommendations would be reported to the U.S. Congress for further consideration under Constitutional processes.

Contrary to being a challenge to the U.S. Constitution and our way of life, the resolution actually proposes only the *exploration* of a way to apply the genius of this same constitutional system to a wider area of land and more people. Those with faith in the American system will welcome this prospect.

The personal liberties enshrined in the Bill of Rights are perhaps the single most important contribution of American political thought to the history of mankind. They are inviolate and are thoroughly safeguarded in the procedures authorized by the resolution.

STATEMENTS REQUIRED BY RULE XI (1) (3) OF THE HOUSE RULES

Pursuant to the requirements of rule XI (1) (3) of the Rules of the House of Representatives, the following statements are made:

(A) *Oversight Findings and Recommendations*

H. J. Res. 606 would establish a U.S. delegation to enter into exploratory discussions regarding U.S.-Atlantic Community relations and cooperation, conceivably leading to Congressional authorization

for specific negotiations on as yet undefined issues. Because the U.S. delegation proposed by H.J. Res. 606 has not been formed, or any specific action other than general exploratory discussion proposed, the Committee makes no oversight findings at this time. However, the Committee recommends that the work of the U.S. delegation, and the progress of the proposed convention be subject to this Committee's oversight at appropriate intervals, and that those findings shall be published in order that interested Members of Congress and the American people may be kept fully informed of developments in this regard.

(B) *Congressional Budget Act Section 308(a) Requirement*

This measure provides no budget authority or increased tax expenditures outside of the regular authorization and appropriation process.

(C) *Congressional Budget Office Estimate and Comparison*

No estimate and comparison prepared by the Director of the Congressional Budget Office under section 403 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 has been received by the committee.

(D) *Committee on Government Operations Summary*

No oversight findings and recommendations have been received which relate to this measure from the Committee on Government Operations under clause 2(b)(2) of rule X.

INFLATIONARY IMPACT STATEMENT

This legislation authorizes the expenditure of only \$200,000 over a period of three years. It therefore has no identifiable inflationary impact.

COST ESTIMATE

The total cost to the United States—including delegation expenses and any contributions toward meeting expenses of the convention—is not to exceed \$200,000 for the entire three-year authorization period. Of this amount, not more than \$100,000 may be used for the U.S. contribution toward meeting the expenses of holding the convention itself, with other participating nations also paying their proportionate share. Remaining funds will be authorized for expenses of the U.S. delegation (which shall serve without pay), such as travel and accommodation meetings, salaries for a temporary professional and clerical staff of not more than ten persons, and office equipment. A more precise breakdown of estimated annual costs will not be possible until dates for the convention have been agreed upon by those nations which desire to participate.

MINORITY VIEWS OF HON. JOHN H. BUCHANAN, JR. ON
HOUSE JOINT RESOLUTION 606

For essentially the same reasons as expressed in my minority views when an earlier, similar resolution was reported out of this Committee in 1973, I oppose and urge the defeat of this resolution.

If the idea of Atlantic Union has ever been desirable, which I doubt, it is a goal no longer achievable, or even relevant.

JOHN H. BUCHANAN.

